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This paper investigates on a marked case of regional inequality concerning the 
information and communication technology adoption process and the role of 
subsidies in Italy. There is a consolidated and persistent gap between the 
industrialized North and the sensibly backward South. Econometric results show 
that adoption of ICT is affected by the geographical location, the industry and 
firm characteristics. A matching estimator is applied to explore subsidies 
effectiveness. We find that subsidies have a significant impact but only for small 
firms. Given the firm system in Italy, we conclude that, to limit the acceleration 
of Italian North-South dualism, subsidies should only be granted to small firms. 
 
Keywords:  information and communication technologies; regional disparities; 
digital divide; subsidies; treatment effect; nearest neighbour matching estimator. 
 
JEL classification: C21, D21, L2, O18.  
 
                                                 
1 We wish to thank the participant at the workshop ‘Competition, Innovation and 
Productivity:  Empirical Evidence from Firm-level Data’, Nice, 19-20 December 2005, 





The revolutionary use of ICT in the last decade has resulted in the 
spread of new opportunities and challenges in many economic regions of 
the world. While the benefits of this ICT paradigm are already evident in 
US, they are still being quantified in Europe. Available evidence 
highlights substantial differences in the extent of IT adoption, not only 
between the EU and the US, but also within the EU (Bassanini et al., 
2000, Schreyer, 2000, Daveri, 2001 among others). The adoption and 
diffusion of ICT capital goods throughout the productive system has 
assumed a core position in the new economy. New technology and 
internet can have effects which are comparable to reductions in transport 
costs, facilitating access to more developed markets for marginal regions. 
This might favour the reduction of disparities among areas. From this 
perspective, it is of foremost importance to pinpoint any constraint that 
might discourage or slacken the rate of ICT adoption. Although the 
global characterization of ICT, public policy should have a significant 
local scope (Iammarino et al., 2004) 
In Italy several studies have been made as new national data has 
become available. Becchetti et al. (2003) investigated the determinants of 
ICT investment and the impact of the ICT component on labour 
productivity and efficiency. They find that ICT investment is affected by 
the industry, the geographical location and the  characteristics of the 
firm. 
Bugamelli and Pagano (2004) find a positive correlation between 
ICT investment, human capital and reorganization. They argue that the 
relatively low value of ICT capital among Italian firms is due to certain 
barriers to investment, such as the low level of human capital and firm 
organization. 
In Atzeni and Carboni (2004) we investigate the impact ICT has 
on total factor productivity and its contribution to output growth. We 
conclude that, rather than being paradoxically under-productive, ICT 
have a disproportionately wide impact on output growth compared to 
their share in total investment. We also find that the impact of ICT on 
productivity is significant and helps to explain North-South performance 
differentials in Italy. In Atzeni and Carboni (2006) we find that 
computers have more effect on output growth than conventional capital.  
When analysing ICT investment behaviour, it is worth noticing at 
least three factors of Italian manufacturing system: sector specialization, 
size, and geographical location (see also Fabiani et al., 2005).  
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The first feature that deserves attention is the limited role of firms 
in the ICT producing sectors in the Italian economy, particularly when 
compared to other industrialized economies. The second is the Italian 
specialization in traditional sectors (essentially textiles, clothing, leather 
and shoes) that are notoriously not information intensive and in general 
benefit little from adopting ICT. Finally such specialization is territorial, 
since in the South firms are smaller and more traditional than in the 
North. 
ICT typically reduces co-ordination and communication costs 
within the firm. However in order to fully exploit their adoption a 
minimum operational scale is required. ICT modifies the optimal firm 
size and its internal organization. From this perspective it is reasonable 
to think that benefits from ICT might be less important for small firms. 
This is particularly true with respect to the process of reorganization 
(firm vertical disintegration for instance). Reorganization implies fixed 
costs that might be precluded in the case of small firms.  
The South, with on average sensibly smaller firms, is likely to be 
disadvantaged in its ICT investment decisions. Small firms are also more 
likely to be financially constrained, and hence to have more difficulties in 
obtaining funds to expand. In this respect Southern firms, once again, 
appear particularly constrained in their attempts to grow through the 
introduction of ICT capital goods. Duality is likely to hold.  
In this work the Italian North-South ICT divide is analysed, using 
a large sample of Italian manufacturing firms. Our contribution is 
twofold. We first question whether specificities in terms of dimension, 
sectoral specialization and geographical location play a role in the firms’ 
decisions on ICT investment. Then we further explore whether state 
subsidies affect this process, and whether they affect the two regions 
differently. Although there are several empirical investigations on the 
impact of subsidies on R&D investment at firm level, no research has 
been specifically oriented to the effect of public aid on ICT. This study 
attempts to advance our knowledge on this issue.  
The Heckman selection model procedure is applied to distinguish 
between determinants of ICT adoption choice on the one side, and what 
induces firms to invest in ICT on the other. Our results highlight 
regional differences and the important role of subsidies, as well as other 
factors.  
We then question whether there are correlations between subsidies 
and ICT adoption within the firms in the sample. The target of the 
subsidy policy is fairly simple. By granting a subsidy, one hopes that 
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additional investment will take place that would not have occurred 
without public support. Moreover, the private return on investment has 
a very important role to play in the efficiency of a subsidy policy. The 
rationale of the subsidy is that the private return is too low (costs too 
high) to justify private investment expenditure. This is likely to be 
particularly true for small sized firms. Given the few benefits they receive 
from ICT, they are less keen to adopt it. In this case granting a subsidy 
would partly compensate for their investment disincentives.  
A matching estimation method for the average treatment effect is 
employed to measure the impact of subsidies on ICT adoption. This 
allows us to determine whether the supported firms would have invested 
the same amount of ICT if they had not received the grant. In line with a 
priori expectations we find evidence that subsidies are effective in 
promoting ICT. On average they improve ICT investment by roughly 
21% per worker. Interestingly, we find that subsidies boost ICT 
investment by 25% for firms in the South and by 20% for those in the 
North. Investigation shows that in this case the size of the firm is a 
critical factor. Regardless of their geographical origins, small firms are 
more affected by public grants while for large firms benefits are not 
clear. Given the number of small firms in the South, it is more 
dependent on public aid for ICT investment decisions (as well as for 
traditional investment).  
The paper is structured as follows. The next section briefly 
describes certain Italian stylised facts. Section 2 illustrates data 
characteristics and descriptive statistics. Section 3 contains the 
methodology. Section 4 outlines the econometric results. Conclusions 
and policy implications are drawn in Section 5. 
 
 
1 – Regional inequality in Italy 
 
One characterizing aspect of the Italian economy is the strong 
duality between the South and the rest of the country. All measurements 
of the economic gap have shown such duality to be remarkably 
persistent (Pigliaru, 2001). The per capita income regional disparities in 
Italy, for instance, are the highest among the European countries (Paci 
and Saba, 1998). In the industrial sector stricto sensu, about 70% of added 
value is produced in the North (IRES, 2002). Productivity differentials 
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are found to be greatly biased in favour of the Northen regions2 and they 
do not appear to be compensated for by corresponding wage differences. 
This might be a sign of low productivity in specialised activities and the 
generally small size of firms in the South (IRES, 2002).  
The capital output ratio is generally higher in the South, implying 
a negative correlation between capital accumulation and development 
level. This is actually contrary to most international evidence. The South 
appears to be backwards both in relation to manufacturing level, and in 
software production, which is dominated by non-local firms. 
The same dynamics also emerge in the extent to which ICT is 
adopted. Recent evidence on Italian industry reveals that there is both a 
dimensional and a territorial aspect to the diffusion of ICT. The survey 
carried out by the Bank of Italy on firm investment in the industrial 
sector highlights that the number of PC’s or expenditure on ICT related 
activities per worker is consistently greater for firms with more than 
1000 employees, and for firms in the North. The South appears 
backward in almost all ICT indicators: investment, PC’s, and Internet 
connections (Trento and Warglien, 2001). 
However, despite the persistent gap between the two areas, there 
has been a non-negligible   ICT sector dynamics in the South. Between 
1996 and 2001 almost one third of the 17,544 ICT firms created in Italy 
were located in the South. At the beginning of 2002 about 43.5% of the 
total number of effective firms in the computer sector were located in 
the South (IRES, 2002). It is worth mentioning  that St Microeletronics, 
Nokia and Tiscali decided to invest in this area. 
 
 
2 – Data and variable description 
 
 The data used in this paper comes from the Survey of 
Manufacturing Firms (SMF) carried out by Capitalia (2002). The SFM 
considers a stratified sample of Italian firms with 11 to 500 employees. It 
also includes all manufacturing firms with more than 500 employees. 
Given the consistently high number of very small firms in Italy 
                                                 
2 Comparing the average of the 4 most productive regions (all in the North), with the 
average of the 4 least productive ones (all in the South), they find that productivity 
differentials are close to 40%, capital output ratio is 14% smaller and human capital is 3% 
bigger in the advanced regions.  
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(particularly considering the zero employee firms) and also bearing in 
mind that service industries are not included in the survey, one should be 
cautious about making generalizations based on this information. The 
SMF has been used in other ICT studies (Bugamelli and Pagano 2004; 
Becchetti et al, 2003; Atzeni and Carboni, 2004, 2006; Piga and Vivarelli, 
2004).  
The data is stratified according to the number of employees, the 
sector, and the location, taking as a benchmark the Census of Italian 
Firms. The SMF contains questionnaire information about firm structure 
and behaviour and twelve years of data on their balance sheets (1989-
2000). Information about ICT expenditure is displayed at a three-year 
level (1998-2000). For the empirical exercises we use the 2001 survey 
which reports figures from 1998 to 2000, while for lagged variables the 
previous wave has been employed (1995-1997). Since only a fraction of 
the observations overlap in the two waves the available data comes from 
2290 firms. 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the whole sample and 
various sub-groups. A marked regional divide is immediately evident. 
Firms from the Centre-South 3 (South in the following) employ less 
workers, generate half of the added value and invest 32% less than do 
northern ones. In the South firms employ a relatively higher level of 
blue-collar workers and are less oriented to R&D. No remarkable 
regional differences emerge when normalising the data for the added 
value or the number of workers, particularly for ICT and total 
investment.  
Relevant dissimilarities are found in the financial market. In the 
South access to credit is hampered by a riskier financial environment. 
This is due to smaller firm size and uneven business opportunities 
available at the local level, as well as certain specific effects in the credit 
market. These aspects are reflected in the percentage of credit rationed 
firms and in the short term regional interest rate. These are both 
significantly higher in the South.  
In this context a relevant role is played by incentives for fixed 
capital. SMF data reports the sources of investment financing, with 
information about public grants and fiscal incentives. The dummy 
subsidies show that 44% of firms in the South received an investment 
                                                 
3 North comprises 7 regions (Lombardia, Piemonte, Liguria, Trentino, Friuli, Veneto, 
Emilia), Centre-South 12 regions (Toscana, Umbria, Marche, Lazio, Abruzzo, Molise, 
Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicilia, Sardegna). 
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subsidy, compared to 35% of those in the northern regions. These 
differences may be important when describing the processes governing 
technology adoption, especially when one considers that one sixth of 
investment is financed by various kind of incentives.  
Subsidised firms are larger than the average, both in terms of 
employees and added value, and they also invest more in terms of added 
value. ICT investment per worker is 31% higher for firms with grants. 
This data is confirmed in the sample split by firm size. Medium-large 
firms (MLF) are more subsidised than small ones (49% vs. 33%). 
The last row of table 1 shows the amount of subsidised 
investment per worker. The sample average is € 3,500 per worker, 
including the zero subsidised firms. On average a subsidised firm 
receives € 9,230 incentive per worker, while no differences are found 
between small and medium-large firms. Firms in the South receive public 
resources which are more than double those of the North. This may be 
the reason for the substantial similarity in the level of total and ICT 
investment per worker in the two areas. 
The Pavitt classification (Tab. 2) shows that firms in the South are 
more traditional and less scale intensive. A similar pattern applies to 
small firms. There are no relevant differences between the subsidised 
and non-subsidised groups. 
 
 
3 - The determinants of ICT adoption 
 
In this section we formulate an equation focusing on a range of 
firm-specific profiles that can help to explain the intensity of ICT 
investment. Several cross-sectional analyses (Lichtenberg, 1995, 
Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 1995, Lehr and Lichtenberg, 1999, Black and 
Lynch, 2001, and Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2002, Hollenstein, 
2004 ), find strong relationships between ICT and other factors within 
the firms. We highlight several groups of factors that may influence a 
firm’s decision to adopt new technology at a certain time. The relevance 
of micro analysis is supported by huge differences in behaviour, 
productivity, size and performance across firms and industries (e.g. ICT 
is not normally distributed). Firm level data is better for measuring 
specific aspects that are very difficult to capture at the aggregate level, 
such as size, industry, age, location, etc.  
Following the Heckman (1979) procedure we estimate a two-
equation ICT investment model in which the dependent variable in the 
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selection process is a dummy with ones for firms adopting ICT and 
zeros otherwise. This allows us to check whether the determinants of 
adoption are different from the determinants of how much to invest and 
to check for sample selection problems, which typically arise when a non-
randomly sampled set of observations is used to make inferences about 
the whole population.  
The selection equation is: 
 










The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if firm i invested in ICT in 
the period. Among the regressors we employ firm age (AGE), a proxy of 
financial distress (RATION), and dummies for reorganization 
(INNORG), subsidies (SUBS) and R&D.   
The investment equation is: 
 
(2)  
iiijiiICT uMKUPWCBCINTNKLI +++++= 54321
* )/(log)/log( βββββ
 
The dependent variable is the three-year ICT investment flow over 
the number of workers. Among the regressors we include capital per 
worker (K/N), average white collar-blue collar ratio (WCBC) and a 
measure of market structure (MKUP). On a regional basis we also 
include the short term interest rate (INT, j =1, 2,…,20). ICT and capital 
variables are divided by labour units in order to avoid dimensional 
effects and log-transformed (see appendix for variables construction).  
The capital intensity (K/N) is important since more capital-
intensive firms may have a higher demand for ICT investment, assuming 
complementarity between ICT and non-ICT capital.  
The variable WCBC is used to capture absorptive capacity linked 
to ICT. Since the knowledge required to master ICT is rapidly changing, 
a variable reflecting the level of skills within the firm may be an 
opportune indicator. In order to make use of computers and related 
technologies, firms need a well-trained labour force. There is plenty of 
evidence (Autor et al., 1998, Johnson, 1997, Bresnahan, T., E. 
Brynjolfsson and L. M. Hitt (2002), among others) that ICT goes hand-
in-hand with a significant and generalised up-skilling of the workforce. 
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This is reflected in the percentage increase in staff with upper-secondary 
education, which is higher than the change in the l total working-age 
population. Greenan and Mairesse (2000), Greenan, Mairesse and 
Topiol-Bensaid (2001) for example, found that there was a positive 
correlation between the number of computers, and the percentage of 
administrative managers in France. 
We explicitly include a measure of mark-up (MKUP) to see the 
link between ICT adoption and firm market power. The expected sign is 
not unequivocal, as, depending on the industry, firms with a certain 
degree of competitive advantage may find they do not need to increase 
their level of technology.  
AGE is employed as an explanatory variable in most studies of 
adoption behaviour (see Karshenas and Stoneman, 1995). One reason 
for including age is that there might be a positive impact on adoption in 
the case of older firms as specific (technological) experience might be 
accumulated  (learning dynamics).  
Some recent studies reveal the complementarity of the adoption 
of new models of workplace organisation (INNORG) and the 
introduction of ICT (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000; OECD 2001a; 2001b; 
McKinsey, 2001; Breshnahan et al., 2002; Bertschek and Kaiser, 2004). 
Organisational advances directly increase productivity. Thus one may 
expect that the adoption of new work practices goes together with the 
intensification of ICT. A major problem of investment in ICT capital 
goods may be the high degree of uncertainty of the results. Reorganizing 
the productive activities (as well as workforce reskilling) helps to fully 
exploit the potentialities offered by the new technologies and to mitigate 
aleatority in their use. However, the need for complementary investment 
might increase the costs to be faced when investing in ICT. Adjustments 
may result in low ICT accumulation. 
Financial constraints (RATION) are in general a good candidate 
for explaining under-investment. Here we try to assess if these also 
constrain in the adoption of ICT capital. We also use this variable to 
capture financial distress on a regional basis, since it represent a proxy of 
a firm’s capability to access the credit market (see appendix for variable 
construction). 
For similar reasons we also include government subsidies (SUBS) 
to investment. These are usually very influential and significant in the 
general investment activities of firms and sectors.  
The model is estimated as a cross-section. For reasons of 
endogeneity K/N and MKUP and WCBC are time lagged. The intercept 
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term has been replaced by 14 industry dummies using the ISTAT-
ATECO classification. Even if not completely satisfactory, this allows us 
to pick up some sectoral heterogeneity. The null hypothesis of 
independence is not accepted, suggesting the presence of a selection 
process.   
Econometric analysis shows that labour composition, age, 
financial constraints, reorganization, subsidies and R&D are good 
predictors of ICT invest decisions. The North-South differences are 
mainly in the magnitude of parameters rather than their significance. The 
results are shown in Table 3. Interestingly for our next analysis, subsidies 
appear to be far more important in the South and are far less important 
for large firms. 
The investment equation results show that the decision about 
how much to invest in ICT depends positively on the capital output ratio 
and the white collar/blue collar ratio as proxy of labour composition, 
and negatively on the regional interest rate, and the mark-up. North-
South differences are related to the non-significance of the regional 
interest rate and mark-up parameters in the North. One plausible 
interpretation is that the greater sensibility to the interest rate in the 
South is linked to the availability of less onerous financial substitutes, 
such as firm incentives to invest. The mark-up coefficient suggests that 
the weaker propensity to invest in new technologies the bigger the 
market power for firms in the South. This is likely to be a symptom of 
weaker competition in these regions, while this is not the case in the 
North, even though the mark-up indices are higher.  
In line with what is expected small firms are more sensitive to 
regional interest rates. It is worth mentioning that the variables 
RATION, SUBS and INT, are not significant for large firms. This is 
likely to be a sign of less severe financial constraints, giving an interesting 
base for analysing the role of subsidies on ICT adoption.  
 
 
4 - The effect of subsidies on ICT adoption 
 
The Investment equations show that technology adoption may be 
strictly dependent on the availability of financial sources. The smaller the 
firm is, and the more it belongs to a region with a less developed 
financial system, the more it is sensitive to the cost and the availability of 
credit. Given its economic and financial duality and the presence of a 
pervasive system of small and medium firms, Italy is a litmus paper for 
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testing the effectiveness of investment subsidy policies on ICT adoption 
across regions and industries. 
 We want to address three main issues when evaluating the 
efficiency of the public policy: 
 
(1) how much does subsidy to overall investments affect ICT 
spending? Even if a subsidy is not specifically granted to boost ICT 
adoption, does the access to free financing spill over into various type of 
investment included ICT?  
 
(2) Do subsidies induce or replace ICT spending? 
 
(3) Are there any regional differences in the impact of the subsidy 
policy?  
 
There are several empirical attempts to estimate the impact of 
subsidies on R&D investment at firm level, and, to our knowledge, none 
on ICT. One common approach is to employ a simple regression model 
in which an outcome variable (e.g. R&D or ICT spending) is regressed 
on the value of the incentive. In the presence of significant and positive 
elasticity of the outcome variable with respect to the subsidy one may 
assert that such a link exists.  
The regression approach has at least one substantial drawback. To 
get the subsidy the firm need to apply for it, and the decision to grant it 
is taken by the government, taking into consideration a set of firm and 
project characteristics. It may happen that some unobservable variables 
influence both the outcome and the decision to give a subsidy, giving rise 
to a non-zero correlation between public funding and the error term. 
In order to address this issue one needs to model the participation 
of the firm in the incentive program, considering that the outcome 
“receiving a subsidy” depends on a decision of the firm to apply for it 
and on the decision of the government. In the case of ICT, this means 
that, conditional on obtaining the incentive, the firm then decides the 
























where A is the expected probability of applying for an ICT 
subsidy, G the probability the incentive is awarded while Y1 and Y0 
represent the ICT effort in the two states, where the states associated 
with receiving the incentive and not receiving it are 1 and 0 respectively. 
L, Z and W are vectors of explanatory variables and u, v and ε the errors 


















This formulation implies that when D=1 a firm has received the 
subsidy having applied for it. In equation (4) X is the set of firm 
characteristics affecting the decision of the firm to join the public 
funding program and of the government to grant it. φ is an error term. 
Moreover, Y1 and Y0 are observed only for participant and non-
participant firms respectively. The evaluation problem is then a problem 
of missing data (Heckman et al, 1998). The benefit of receiving the 
subsidy can be measured as the difference ∆ = Y1-Y0  if we observe the 
two outcomes (ICT investment effort) for the same firm. Observational 
data does not contain sample counterparts for the missing counterfactual 
Y0 for subsidised firms, which need to be inferred in some way from the 
sample.  
A method which is often used is matching (Heckman et al, 1998; 
Heckman and Navarro-Lozano, 2004). In the absence of experimental 
data, matching estimators have the convenient feature of approximating 
a randomised experiment ex post. Angrist and Hahn (2004) show that 
matching is more efficient than the propensity score technique, while 
Smith and Todd (2005) provide a detailed evaluation of the performance 
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of different matching estimators such as nearest neighbour matching, 
kernel and local linear matching, and difference-in-differences matching.  
In general, matching estimation is characterized by the type of 
algorithm and the distance measure chosen (Augurzky and Kluwe, 2004). 
However, some source of bias is difficult to eliminate, depending on the 
characteristics of the data. Smith and Todd (2005) show that with high 
quality data, rich in variables related to participation and outcomes, 
matching results are the best choice. 
The most common evaluation parameter is the mean effect of 
treatment on the treated, which gives us information about how much a 
treated firm (receiving the incentive) benefits compared to what it would 
have done if not treated (not receiving the subsidy). The parameter is 
given by: 
 
(6) )1,|()1,|( 01 =∆==− DXEDXYYE   
 
Using non experimental data the parameter estimation is obtained 
assuming that conditional on X, (Y1, Y0) and D are independent: 
 
(7) XDYY |),( 01 ⊥     
 
where ⊥  denotes independence. This assumption is required so 
that, conditional on X, the non-subsidised firms’s outcomes have the 
same distribution as firms would have achieved if they had not 
participated in the public funding programme. This restriction, also 
known as “selection on observables” or unconfoundness, requires that 
the choice of participation is “purely random” for similar individuals 
(Abadie and Imbens, 2002).  
In terms of our analysis this means that, given firms 
characteristics, if receiving the subsidies affects only the level of ICT but 
not the distribution of ICT efforts across firms, we may construct the 
missing counterfactual (i.e. the behaviour of firms which are in the 
programme if they were not in the programme) using the outcomes (ICT 
investment) of non-subsidised firms.  
An identification assumption is also required, because if all 
individuals with given characteristics choose to participate in the 
programme, there would be no observation on similar individuals that 
choose not to participate (Abadie and Imbens, 2002). Formally: 
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In the terms first used by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), when 
both condition are satisfied, the treatment is said to be ‘strongly 
ignorable’, so that the non-randomised experiment can be treated as if it 
were a randomised one. 
As pointed out by Abadie and Imbens (2002), these conditions are 
in many cases not satisfied, giving rise to some bias in the estimation. 
However, various studies make extensively use of matching methods 
(Rosenbaum and and Rubin, 1985; Rosenbaum, 1995; Heckman et al, 
1998). Imbens (2004) reviewed various methods used to estimate the 
average treatment effect under the above assumption, discussing the 
plausibility of the exogeneity assumption in economic application. 
In order to consider the bias arising in the estimation of average 
treatment effect we employ the routine provided in Abadie et al (2004), 
which implements the specific bias-corrected matching estimator 
developed in Abadie and Imbens (2002). The methodology employs 
“nearest neighbour matching” for average treatment effect.  
As discussed above, only one potential outcome is observed for 
each firm. Nearest neighbour matching calculates the missing potential 
outcome by taking average outcomes for firms with similar values for the 
covariates4. We use matching with replacement which allows a given 
non-subsidised firm to be matched to more than one subsidised one. 
Allowing replacement improves the quality of matches at the expense of 
the number of observations used to calculate the counterfactual mean, 
increasing the variance of the estimator (Smith and Todd, 2005). 
Although matching on a multidimensional set of firm characteristics (X) 
may give rise to a non-negligible bias, the matching approach combined 
with the bias adjustment procedure leads to estimators with little 
remaining distortion. 
                                                 
4 Let ( ) 2/1' xVxx
V
=   be the vector norm with positive definite weight matrix V. 
V
xz −  is defined as the distance between the vectors x and z. Let dM(i) be the distance 
from the covariates for unit i, Xi, to the Mth nearest match with the opposite treatment. 
This is the distance such that strictly fewer than M units are closer to unit i than dM(i), 
and at least M units are as close as dM(i) (Abadie et al, 2004).  
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We estimate the average treatment effect for the treated firms 
using as outcome variable ICT investment per worker. The treatment is a 
dummy Di =1 if the firm received a subsidy and Di =0  otherwise. 
Information about the level of the incentives devoted specifically to ICT 
is not available in the data set. The exercise we carry out aims to check 
whether the availability of costless financial resources has a significant 
effect on technology adoption.   
The outcome variable is the logarithm of ICT investment per 
worker. The choice of the matching variables is based on these criteria: 
 
1. firm specific variables that at the time of application were 
observable by the public agency and relevant for the decision to grant 
the subsidy; 
 
2. variables that indicate regional location and capture financial 
market disparities (i.e. regional interest rate); 
 
3. variables that are statistically significant in the estimation of ICT 
adoption determinants. 
 
Differently from a propensity score approach, in which covariates 
need to determine the probability of receiving the treatment, the 
matching estimator only considers those characteristics which affect the 
outcome variable (the level of ICT investment). 
The variables used for the matching come from the two-stage 
investment equation of section 3. They are: logarithm of the average 
capital per worker in the previous period (1995-97), the average white 
collar blue collar ratio (1995-97), the level of mark-up in 1997, the 
average regional short term interest rate during the triennium, a dummy 
R&D equal to 1 if the firm is engaged in R&D projects, dummy North 
equal to 1 if the firm is located in a northern region and dummies for 
Pavitt industry classification. This procedure gives a more homogeneous 
distribution of ICT efforts among subsidised and non-subsidised firms, 
since firms are matched only with those similar in terms of ICT 
determinants. Thus, we impose the dummy North to be constrained as 
an exact match, so that no firm from the North can be matched with a 
similar one located in the South. 
 In Table 4 the average treatment effect for the treated (ATT) is 
reported (row 1). Given that data are expressed in millions of euros, the 
coefficient has an immediate interpretation: receiving the subsidy has a 
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positive effect on the treated firms, increasing ICT investment per 
employee by € 248. The estimation confirms that aids to investment 
have a positive and significant effect on ICT. Had the subsidy not be 
granted the treated firms would have invested less in ICT.  
To test how much of the unspecific incentive spills over into ICT 
investment, we estimate the average treatment effect on the level of total 
investment per worker, using the same set of covariates (see Tab. 5). The 
overall effect of the treatment amounts to € 14,700 per employee. The 
impact of subsidies on ICT is only 1.3% of the overall effect, which is 
rather small considering that ICT outlays represent 16% of total 
investment (see Table 1 for descriptive statistics).  
The main concern of our research is, however, that of checking 
for the existence of possible regional disparities in the effect of subsidies. 
To do this we split data in two sub-samples, depending on the firm’s 
geographical location. Table 4 reports the results (rows 2 and 3). For 
firms in the South the ATT is € 261 per employee, showing an effect of 
subsidies, which is 5.2% above the average for the whole sample.  
Incentives to investment have an impact on ICT adoption of € 247 for 
firms located in the North. In detail, grants improve ICT investment by 
roughly 25% for firms in the South and by 20% for those in the North, 
suggesting that the investment incentive policy is more effective in the 
South. 
Interesting results are obtained when the firm’s dimensions and 
geographical location are combined (Table 4, rows 4 and 5). Splitting the 
sample according to the firm’s dimensions, we find that subsidies are 
particularly effective for those with less than 50 employees (small firms), 
while they are totally irrelevant for medium and large firms. These results 
are confirmed by the estimation of ATT for large firms in both macro-
regions. Subsidies are shown to have a positive effect on ICT for small 
firms (SF) in the South, and appear to be particularly important for the 
same group in the North (row 6 and 7). Incentive to total investment 
does not seem to have any impact on ICT if granted to medium and 
large firms (MLF), regardless of their geographical location.  
These results support the idea that the regional technological 
duality is linked to firm dimensions and it may be significantly affected 
by the incentive policy, whose regional pattern clearly appears from the 
estimations.  
While for SF incentive impact is always positive, it is not the case 
for MLF. The non-significance of parameter for these latter firms can be 
interpreted as partial crowding out effect. Since they are not sensitive to 
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the incentives, this implies that they would have invested the same 
amount of ICT without the grant. In this case the public support is not 
effective and it turns out to be a mere ‘premium’. 
The overall effect of subsidies is relevant for the level of total 
investment per worker, while they poorly spill-over on ICT. 
 
 
5 – Conclusion and policy implications. 
 
Recent evidence suggests that ICT is a relevant factor in growth 
performance. It is of paramount importance to pinpoint any constraint 
that might friction the process of adoption. ICT produces effects that 
are similar to transport cost reduction, since it ameliorates market access 
for peripheral regions. This might potentially turn into new opportunities 
for backward areas.  
  Using a sample of Italian firms, this paper provides evidence on 
the determinants of ICT spending and the effects of subsidies on it. We 
find that the decision to adopt is positively correlated to age, workplace 
organisation, R&D and subsidies, while it is negatively affected by severe 
credit constraints. Decision of how much to adopt is positively linked to 
capital per worker ratio, worker structure proxied by the white-collar 
blue-collar ratio and negatively by regional interest rates and mark-up.  
Data and regression results confirm the a priori evidence that the 
firms in the South, though equipped with a higher capital output ratio, 
are not those adopting more ICT. The weaker penetration of ICT in the 
South is associated with a lower reorganisation of work practices, size 
and sector specialization. In this part of the country firms are negatively 
affected in their ICT investment decisions by their market position. A 
dominant position in the market seems to slow the introduction of new 
technologies.  
Belonging to a less developed financial system does not favour a 
leaning to technology. In our analysis this can be seen from the higher 
sensitivity to regional interest rates in the South. This higher price 
elasticity may be due to the greater availability in the area of costless 
financial substitutes such as subsidies. 
The South also appears to lag behind in sector specialization. 
Traditional sectors, which are dominant in this area, are notoriously less 
information intensive and their capital stock is probably less adaptable to 
ICT. These sectors normally have a low human capital level, which also 
strongly discourages ICT investment. 
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One important finding is that differences in ICT adoption are 
closely related the firm size. Small firms show, in fact, less propensity to 
new technologies. However, what makes the story interesting is that 
there is a significant territorial coincidence, since the average firm size in 
the South is sensibly smaller. There is plenty of available evidence that 
large firms have been more dynamic in the process of reorganization. 
Those firms have, in fact, advantages in the use of ICT which are only 
partially linked to their greater financial endowments. ICT benefits for 
these firms come particularly from communication, coordination and 
routines. Moreover, ICT diffusion is faster when large firms are present, as 
these normally generate positive externalities to the system and reduce 
the uncertainty on new investment.  
This reinforces the idea of a geographical cluster in Italy: subsidies 
have a greater impact on small firms in the North, which are more keen 
to invest in new technologies. Conversely, the South appears be trapped 
by its own structural weakness, particularly concerning its low level of 
ICT use and diffusion and the prevalence of small sized firms operating 
mostly in the traditional sector. Moreover, the need for complementary 
investment increases the cost of ICT spending. Once again, small firms 
will presumably be more disadvantaged. North-South duality in this case 
is likely to become stronger.  
Within this framework, government support may be an effective 
tool. The rationale for the subsidy is that the private return is too low to 
stimulate private investment. In general, it is true that the less the private 
return on investment, the more a subsidy is useful. 
Exploring the effect of subsidies on the level of a company’s ICT 
expenditures, we find that the global effect of incentives is positive, 
which means that firms would have adopted more had they all received 
grants. Furthermore, there is no crowding out effect on small firms’ 
private investment, while this does not apply to medium-large firms, 
since they are likely to adopt ICT regardless of government support. In 
this case the public support is not effective and it represents a ‘premium’ 
to firms regardless of their geographical location.  
Given the few benefits that small firms generally receive from new 
technologies, they would be little keen to invest in ICT, especially 
considering the amount of complementary investments that ICT 
requires. Overall ICT costs would probably prevent small firms from 
adopting technology. In this case granting a subsidy would compensate 
for these investment disincentives. Firms in the South may reap 
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particularly benefits from this and partly overcome their external and 
internal constraints.  
According to our results duality would be sounder if subsidies 
were not given. This may supply a reasonable partial explanation of the 
fact that despite higher interest rates, heavier credit constraints and more 
pronounced system structural weakness, firms in the South invest an 
amount of ICT per worker which is not very different from that in the 
North. Financial constraints and higher interest rates are normally good 
candidates for explaining under investment. It might be the case that 
incentives substitute funds from the market, relieving financial market 
imperfections.  
Public aid ought to be granted in order to mitigate the Italian 
North-South economic dualism. They should be granted to small firms 
particularly if localized in the South. Given a prevailing small size of 
firms, this area is more dependent on public aid when making 
investment decisions. Furthermore because firms are disinclined to 
invest in ICT rather than traditional investment, subsidies should be 
















AGE: firm age at the end of period (2000) 
RATION: in the SMF there are three questions that can be used to 
directly evaluate the firm’s access to the credit market: 1) whether at the 
current market interest rate the firm wants an additional quantity of 
credit; 2) whether the firm is willing to pay a higher interest rate to 
obtain that additional quantity; 3) whether the firm applied but the credit 
was denied. RATION is a dummy=1 if the firm answer yes to the 
second or to the third question. It is a proxy of firm financial distress. 
INNORG: dummy = 1 if firm declares to have completed processes of 
reorganisation during the period. 
SUBS: dummy=1 if firm received a subsidy or a tax reduction.  
R&D: dummy =1 if firm has positive R&D outlays. 
 
Investment equation : 
 
IICT/ N: ICT investment per worker. N is the average number of 
employees during the period. 
K/N: gross book value of fixed assets per worker. 
INT: average short term interest rate at regional level during 1998-2000. 
WCBC: white collar-blue collar ratio. 
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Tab. 1 - Descriptive statistics – thousand euros 
 Whole sample South North Small firms Medium-Large firms Subsidized firms Not subsidized firms 
variable N mean sd N mean sd N mean sd N mean sd N mean sd N mean sd N mean sd 
Number of employees 
(average 1998-2000) 2290 83.54 253.09 803 60.14 175.53 1487 96.18 285.62 1609 24.71 10.09 681 222.54 433.4 868 107.16 345.25 1422 69.12 172.93 
Value added 
(average 1998-2000) 2290 4339.61 19001 803 2856.75 12247 1487 5140.3 21757.2 1609 1006. 649.0 681 12214.5 33555.7 868 5942.6 28202.3 1422 3361.12 9684.6 
Value added 
(average 1995-1997) 2290 3519.95 12116 803 2396.72 9134 1487 4126.5 13418.3 1609 879.1 636.8 681 9759.28 20922.0 868 4677.49 17230.9 1422 2813.38 7349.3 
Fixed capital per worker 
(average 1995-1997) 2261 179.12 230.64 785 190.36 291 1476 173.14 190.75 1581 162.2 233.1 680 218.35 219.97 864 199.8 237.87 1397 166.33 225.19 
Fixed capital per worker 
(average 1998-2000) 2290 195.96 212.41 803 195 220.91 1487 196.47 207.76 1609 182.5 207.8 681 227.71 219.74 868 220.09 212.61 1422 181.22 211.02 
Total investment (1998-
2000) 2290 2096.46 9813.6 803 1593.33 7548.6 1487 2368.1 10834.4 1609 472.1 789.6 681 5934.21 17370.0 868 3244.23 13964 1422 1395.85 5904.8 
Total investment on value 
added (1998-2000) 2290 0.17 0.41 803 0.19 0.31 1487 0.16 0.45 1609 0.17 0.46 681 0.17 0.23 868 0.24 0.3 1422 0.13 0.46 
Total investment per 
worker (1998-2000) 2290 20.82 30.93 803 21.07 33.45 1487 20.68 29.49 1609 19.07 29.13 681 24.94 34.5 868 30.77 36.9 1422 14.74 24.76 
ICT investment (1998-
2000) 2290 114.81 408.78 803 76.75 314.38 1487 135.36 450.39 1609 26.48 49.04 681 323.5 703.37 868 154.16 504.24 1422 90.79 335.44 
ICT investment on value 
added (1998-2000) 2290 0.01 0.02 803 0.01 0.02 1487 0.01 0.01 1609 0.01 0.02 681 0.01 0.01 868 0.01 0.02 1422 0.01 0.01 
ICT investment per worker 
(1998-2000) 2290 1.17 1.8 803 1.05 1.74 1487 1.24 1.83 1609 1.05 1.75 681 1.47 1.9 868 1.38 1.9 1422 1.05 1.73 
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 Whole sample South North Small firms Medium-Large firms Subsidized firms Not subsidized firms 
variable N mean sd N mean sd N mean sd N mean sd N mean sd N mean sd N mean sd 
ICT investment on total 
investment (1998-2000) 2063 0.16 0.27 705 0.16 0.3 1358 0.16 0.26 1405 0.17 0.29 658 0.13 0.22 855 0.1 0.19 1208 0.2 0.31 
Average short term regional 
interest rate (1998-2000) 2290 6.58 0.85 803 7.39 0.82 1487 6.14 0.43 1609 6.61 0.86 681 6.5 0.81 868 6.72 0.93 1422 6.49 0.78 
Mark up 1997 2251 0.26 0.87 780 0.25 0.18 1471 0.27 1.07 1571 0.24 1.04 680 0.32 0.15 861 0.29 0.16 1390 0.25 1.1 
White collar blue collar 
ratio (average 1998-2000) 2290 0.72 1.22 803 0.64 0.96 1487 0.77 1.34 1609 0.77 1.28 681 0.62 1.08 868 0.68 1.25 1422 0.75 1.2 
Firm Reorganization  
(dummy=1 if firm has 
carried out a process of 
reorganisation) 
2290 0.09 0.29 803 0.07 0.26 1487 0.1 0.3 1609 0.06 0.25 681 0.16 0.37 868 0.14 0.34 1422 0.07 0.25 
R&D (dummy=1 if firm is 
engaged in R&D programs) 2290 0.41 0.49 803 0.36 0.48 1487 0.44 0.5 1609 0.32 0.47 681 0.63 0.48 868 0.48 0.5 1422 0.37 0.48 
Firm age 2290 25.15 18.24 803 22.07 16.42 1487 26.82 18.94 1609 22.44 15.84 681 31.57 21.62 868 26.19 19.11 1422 24.52 17.66 
Credit rationing (dummy 
=1 if firm is credit rationed) 2290 0.09 0.29 803 0.12 0.33 1487 0.08 0.27 1609 0.09 0.29 681 0.09 0.29 868 0.1 0.3 1422 0.09 0.29 
Subsidies (dummy=1 if 
firm received subsidies to 
investment) 
2290 0.38 0.49 803 0.44 0.5 1487 0.35 0.48 1609 0.33 0.47 681 0.49 0.5 868 1 0 1422 0 0 
Subsidised investment per 
worker 2290 3.50 10.51 803 5.23 14.40 1487 2.57 7.49 1609 3.50 10.80 681 3.50 9.83 868 9.23 15.47 1422 0 0 
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Tab. 2 – Sectoral composition according to Pavitt classification. 
 Whole sample South North SF MLF Subsidised Non Subsidised 
        
Supplier dominated 54% 69% 46% 60% 41% 55% 54% 
Specialised suppliers 17% 15% 18% 17% 17% 18% 15% 
Scale Intensive 24% 12% 30% 20% 34% 23% 26% 




























Tab. 3 - ICT adoption  
 Whole 
sample South North SF MLF 
 
# obs. 2290 




# obs. 803 




# obs. 1487 









# obs. 681  
# Cens. 





Wald Chi 2 
(18) = 774 
Wald Chi 2 
(18) = 186.4 
Wald Chi 2 
(18) = 614.7 
Wald Chi 2 
(18) = 
399.2 
Wald Chi 2 
(18) = 
346.7 














































 log INVICT/N      

















































L.R. of indep. 
equat. (Rho=0) 
Chi 2 
82.89 16.91 61.47 40.51 42.88 
MLE cross-section estimation.  
Dependent variable in the selection equation ICT adoption dummy =1 if firm invested 
in ICT during the 1998-2000 period. Dependent variable log INVICT/N= log ICT 
investment per employee. AGE: firm age. RATION: dummy =1 if firm declared to be 
credit rationed (see appendix for further details). INNORGA: dummy = 1 if firm 
carried out a process of reorganisation. SUBS: dummy =1 if firm received investment 
subsidies. R&D: dummy =1 if firm is engaged in R&D process. Log K/N: log average 
capital per employee during 1995-97. INT: short term average regional interest rate 
during 1998-2000. WC/BC: average white collar blue collar ratio during 1995-97. 
MKUP: firm mark up in 1997 (see appendix for further details). Intercept terms 





Tab.  4 - Average treatment effect on ICT investment for subsidised 
firms.* 
 Sample # obs. ATT Std. Error z P >| z | 
1 Whole sample   2251 0.248 0.087 2.86 0.004 
2 South  771 0.261 0.131 1.94 0.047 
3 North  1480 0.246 0.117 2.10 0.036 
4 Medium and Large firms (MLF) 689 0.054 0.161 0.34 0.737 
5 Small Firms (SF)  1562 0.336 0.099 3.37 0.001 
6 SF – South  594 0.273 0.149 1.83 0.068 
7 SF – North  968 0.387 0.148 2.6 0.009 
8 MLF - South  177 0.099 0.249 0.40 0.691 
9 MLF – North 512 0.041 0.214 0.19 0.848 
  
* ATT obtained with nearest neighbour matching estimator, with bias correction and 
controlling for heteroskedasticity (Abadie et al, 2004). Treatment variable: dummy=1 if 
firm received a subsidy to total investment and 0 otherwise. Outcome variable: logarithm 
of ICT investment per worker [log (IICT/N)]. Matching variables: logarithm of the average 
capital per worker in the previous period (1995-1997) [log (K/N) 1995-97]; the average 
white collar blue collar ratio in the previous period [WC/BC 1995-97]; the level of mark-up 
in 1997[MKUP 1997]; the regional average short term interest rate during the period 1997-
2000 [INT 1997-2000]; a dummy R&D=1 if the firm is involved in R&D projects and 0 
otherwise; dummy North=1 if the firm is located in a northern region; dummies for Pavitt 
















Tab.  5- Average treatment effect on total investment for subsidised 
firms.*  
 
# obs. ATT Std. Error z P >| z | 
2251 14.89 1.48 10.03 0.000 
  
 
* ATT obtained with nearest neighbour matching estimator, with bias correction and 
controlling for heteroskedasticity (Abadie et al, 2004). Treatment variable: dummy=1 if 
firm received a subsidy to total investment and 0 otherwise. Outcome variable: logarithm 
of total investment per worker [log (I/N)]. Matching variables: logarithm of the average 
capital per worker in the previous period (1995-1997) [log (K/N) 1995-97]; the average 
white collar blue collar ratio in the previous period [WC/BC 1995-97]; the level of mark-up 
in 1997[MKUP 1997]; the regional average short term interest rate during the period 1997-
2000 [INT 1997-2000]; a dummy R&D=1 if the firm is involved in R&D projects and 0 
otherwise; dummy North=1 if the firm is located in a northern region. North is 
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